



DECOLONISATION IN AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

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ABSTRACT

In essence, African political thought evolved as a result of colonialism and the anti-colonial reactions of first-order African elites. The debate among the episodic and the epochal school of thought over the place of colonialism in African political thought suggests that it took colonialism to inform the people of the continent that they were Africans. Also that Africa had a glorious pre-colonial past. It offered the diverse peoples of the continent a rallying point for unity. This unity was the basis of the anti-colonial reactions especially in the decade before political independence in Africa. This work attempts to examine the origin of African political thought, and the decolonization process in selected regions of the continent namely North-West Africa (Tunisia and Morocco) and British West-Africa. The main source of data collection depends on secondary materials.

INTRODUCTION

With masters and slaves, conquerors, and conquered peoples with their lands, labor, and territories, imperialism dominated the world order from the 16th to mid-20th centuries. In the 1880s, Europeans scrambled for Africa. Between 1875 and 1889 with the tempo of events steadily mounting in the mid-1880s, the major powers of Western Europe established political claims to many parts of Africa in most of which they had shown no previous interest.

As late as 1950 most of Africa was still under the control of European powers. Britain was dominant in much of West, East and South Africa. In addition, Britain governed directly the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and the Rhodesias. France was still in control of Morocco and Tunisia as well as Algeria, which was technically a part of metropolitan France. Portugal controlled the vast areas of Angola and Mozambique. Spain possessed the Spanish Sahara and other pockets in the north-western part of the continent. By the end of the decade the process of decolonization was almost completed. The unscrambling of the major European empires in Africa was proceeding as swiftly and to many observers as unexpectedly as the original scramble for African territory was done. The concept of Decolonization in African Political Thought can best be examined and analyzed in the context of its processes (Ayoade & Adigun, 1989). African civilizations like Egypt, Ethiopia, and even the empire-building in Western Sudan, these were attributed to Hemites and Semites of European or Asian stock who had brought 'civilization' to Africa. African history taught in schools was replete with European discoveries as colonial education justified colonialism's evils. Pioneer African political historians encountered this unfortunate situation. In the 1950s, however, anti-colonial sentiments and ideologies shaped such concepts as "Pan Africanism," "Nationalism," "African Personality," and "Negritude." This period marked the dawn of an emerging Africanism (Eghosa, 1991). According to Ekeh (1991), the African ruling class accepts colonialism's principles but rejects the foreigners who ruled. Various self-interest begotten theories have been invented to justify ruling its own people in place of the colonizer. Today, African Political Thought is largely based on these 'theories'. In this work, we examine the origins of African political thought and decolonization in selected African regions. The main source of data collection depends on secondary materials.

COLONIALISM AND ROOT OF AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

According to some, the corpus of thinking referred to as "African political thought" is largely a result of colonialism and the anti-colonial responses to it by the first-order African elites who are now considered African political thinkers (Eghosa, 1991). This argument does not appear to be new in any way, especially from the perspective of colonial apologists and their cohorts, who are primarily of the racial variety and who are quick to dismiss the existence of any indigenous African philosophical tradition prior to the arrival of European colonialism (Fortes & Evan-Pritchard, 1940). Africans, according to Fortes and Evan-Pritchard, "do not analyze their social order, they live it. The causes that actually govern their social behavior are not explained; instead, they are thought of and felt in terms of ideals that are



reflected in dogma and symbol.

One quickly realizes that most Africanists have argued that colonialism did not bring Africa or its way of thinking because of this denial. The end effect is that Africanists deny colonialism its proper place and obscure the real contributions of the colonial situations to the development of what is appropriately referred to as contemporary African political thinking in their general enthusiasm of constructing an Africans. It must be noted at this juncture that the majority of Africanists who cite original African initiatives and autochthoneity of thought in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods glorify the African past and pretend, in a sense that the roots of contemporary African thought can be found there. It is argued that colonialism's contribution to the development of African thought must, in fact, be seen as part of an overarching whole that is essentially African, rather than a primary factor in the development of African thought, as in such a scheme, colonialism becomes just one of those other experiences like the rise and fall of old empires, ageless inter-group relations, religious beliefs, indigenous socio-political organizations, etc. (Eghosa, 1991). Examining the question of whether colonialism in Africa was an "episode" or an "epoch" provides a useful beginning point for thinking about the role of colonialism in African political philosophy. We will analyze the viewpoints of the two schools of thought in some detail in order to properly comprehend the challenges raised by the competing paradigms.

The first-order generation of Africanist historians who had to, in a sense, rewrite and reconstruct African history, stressing that Africa, contrary to what the colonizers made us believe, had a glorious pre-colonial past, gave rise to the episodic school, which was championed by pioneer African historians like Dike, Ade Ajayi, and Ogot and given institutional representation by the Ibadan school of African history (Dike, 1956; Ade Ajayi, 1968; Ogot, 1967). Prior to this, the colonization of Africa had been justified by the racial justification that whites were the superior race who had come to take on the burden of "civilizing" a primitive and unexplored Africa that was populated mostly by an inferior black race. It was said that, prior to the arrival of the Europeans, Africans had no notable history, were illiterate, and lived on a "black continent."

Hegel, a famous philosopher, rejected Africa as a pointless region of the earth as recently as 1830/31:

At this point we leave Africa much less. Because it is not a historical part of the world: it has no movement or development to show... Our correct understanding of Africa is an ahistorical, underdeveloped spirit that still involves pure the natural conditions of the world can only be shown here at the threshold of world history" (Hegel, 1963).

The research of colonial anthropologists is based on this distasteful and degrading assertion. These anthropologists are good at asserting that African history does not predate African contact with Europeans. Their approach is largely descriptive, and they ignore African initiatives before and during colonialism, particularly the string of resistance movements against European colonialism. Any attention to Africa's past underscores the barbaric nature of intergroup relations, the so-called tribal warfare, paganism and human sacrifice. Since colonial education entails justifying the evils of colonialism, African history taught in schools is filled with European discourses about Africa. As a product of this era, Africans turned inward to celebrate Africa's past. They remind us that in the pre-colonial era, the famous empires of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Benin and Oyo flourished and warriors such as Chaka of Zululand, Jaja of Obobo fought fiercely with European domination war. These, and more, were resurrected to counteract the denial effects of colonialism.

Proponents of the Ibadan historical school, who see dates and periods as strong points in historiography, reasonably estimate that if colonialism lasted only about 75 years (from 1885, the year of partition, to 1960, most people would year of independence) Africa), then, of course, in the context of Africa's long history, it is far less important than is commonly claimed. Much criticism has been directed at the plot school. Its emphasis on dates and periods is said to distort the reality of the colonial situation because, as (Ekeh, 1991) argues, major developments in colonialism are shadowed in the dates of historiography. For example, using 1885 as the effective date of colonization would undermine the far-reaching effects of early European-African contacts, especially in the slave trade and evangelism. With regard to the slave trade in particular, it is generally not recognized or underestimated that trade is the reason for the emergence of new power blocs in former colonial African countries, as they provide themselves with new opportunities for status and wealth. These emerging power variables partly explain some of the glory claimed by the ancient African empires.

However, the colonial imprint must go beyond the colonial situation. This is where time-sighted African scholars achieve their greatest intellectual triumph. Sklar commented that it "marked a major breakthrough in postcolonial freedom in political thought and analysis, as it acknowledged that colonialism produced enduring social formations" (Sklar, 1985). So colonialism was an era comparable to world-dominant eras such as the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. Like other more famous eras, colonialism in Africa produced profound qualitative and transpersonal social changes, introduced large-scale and enduring social formations, and consolidated social structures. Furthermore, the importance of its structure has surpassed the colonial era itself and integrated Africa into the world system. The point is, things have fallen apart since colonialism, and postcolonial Africa bears little or no qualitative resemblance to precolonial history. Certainly so, because with the advent of colonialism, empires, segments, and decentralized societies were sacked and replaced by new states, mostly the artificial creations of colonial masters. With colonialism came the introduction of Western institutions and government procedures.

Christianity, the one-to-one maxim of Western societies, the monetization of the economy and consequent capitalism, emphasizes the exploitation of raw materials for the colonialist metropolis and, of course, the underdevelopment of



Africa in the world capitalist system. Of course, with all these shifts that make up the reality of postcolonial Africa, colonialism cannot be just one of other events in African political thought and history.

Ekeh divides the social formations that emerged during the colonial era into three categories. First, the "transformed indigenous social structure", while existing in the pre-colonial era, took on new symbolism and meaning in the changing colonialist environment. An important example here is chieftainship and kingship under colonial rule, where the power of most traditional authorities was increased, even to dictatorial levels, and where there was no central authority before, "quasi-chiefs" were appointed to facilitate colonial administration.

The second form of colonial society is the "migratory social structure" introduced in large numbers from the mother colony country. These include Western models of democracy, rule of law, bureaucracy, and universities, which to a large extent formed the unique African characteristics of the colonial era. Of particular importance, these institutions have lost the moral content that exists in their Western form. This explains the abundance of corruption and other vices that have emerged in African immigrant political establishments. Furthermore, in the absence of the moral and ethical drive for self-improvement and expansion that arises in Europe, these institutions and processes are often immobile due to organizational fixation as Africans try to keep inherited traditions intact, ostensibly in pursuit of excellence, at the time their prototypes in Europe were already moving in a positive direction.

Third, these are "emerging social structures" that are neither native to Africa nor migrated from colonial centers. Rather, they emerged and developed with colonialism "to meet social needs that indigenous social structures and migrating social structures could not meet in the new colonial environment". These emerging structures are further differentiated: while indigenous and immigrant structures are mostly formal, emerging structures are informal, and secondly, they bear the imprint of tradition and modernity. The best example of this structure is the ethnic groups and ethnic groups that emerged later.

As Raymond Apsop told us, "What happened was that colonial regimes administratively created what we think of as tribes today... For example, he points out that the Blueia in western Kenya were Colonial administrative units emerged in the form of 'tribes' between 1935 and 1945. Likewise, Thomas Hodgkin noted, "Everyone recognized that the concept of 'being Nigerian' was a new one. But it seems that the concept of "becoming a Yoruba" is not old. Clearly, the present African states and their professed allegiances, like the new racial reality, are emerging social structures.

All of this suggests that colonialism in Africa was an epoch, not an episode. Some even claim that "Africa", "African's" and "Africans" are all products of colonialism. This means that colonialism nurtured and created a "sense of oneness" in Africa, in Nyerere's words. He further observed that,

"Africans across the continent, without saying a word to one another or one African country to another, they look at Europeans, look at each other, and know that, as far as Europeans are concerned, they are one"

Mazrui rightly argues that the logical conclusion of Nyerere's view is that "colonialism made Africans know they were Africans" (Mazrui, 1963). As unpleasant as this may sound, colonialism did provide a rallying point for the different peoples of the continent, a unity that has since distinguished Africa and Africans from the rest. As Onige puts it, "The humiliating and provocative exposure of European colonialism by subjects created a set of shared attitudes and a reactive anticolonial ideology peculiar to Africans (Otite, 1978).

At the end of the day, we must admit that colonialism is an era, not only because it is so easy to leave its colonial imprint on Africa, but more importantly, it provides an understanding of African postcolonial political thought. It marks an important paradigm in the search for the roots of "modern", postcolonial African thought, because, as Sklar puts it:

Until the centrality of colonialism, the "epoch" nature and transformative effects of which had been thoroughly and objectively studied by African scholars, the demons of colonialism - the psychology of dependence - could not be expelled from African political thought... (Sklar, 1985)

Decolonization in North-West Africa: Tunisia and Morocco

Under French protection both Tunisia and Morocco retained a semblance of their historic personalities. Thus their experience of colonial rule differed markedly from that of other African territories where substantial states, such as Ashanti, Buganda, or the Caliphate of Sokoto, found themselves incorporated in entirely novel political structures. Clearly it was much easier for a citizen of Fez or of Tunis, living among the monuments of a noble past, to think of himself as a Moroccan or a Tunisian than it was for a man from Ashanti or Buganda to accept the notion of Ghanaian or Ugandan nationalism. Thus the national movement in the two French protectorates of the Maghrib was never weakened by the tribal divisions that affected the modern political development of other African territories containing elaborate polities with long historical traditions. Both Moroccans and Tunisians possessed a certain national consciousness at the time when they were first brought under colonial rule (Hallett Robin, 1974).

Particularly influential for the Maghrib was the teaching of the Amir Shakib Arslan, member of a noble Lebanese family and disciple of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammed Abduh. Arslan settled in Geneva in 1918 and lived there till his death in 1946. He was visited by many of the leading Maghribi politicians of the day and was able to achieve a wider circulation for his ideas through publication of a journal, *La Nation arabe*.

In Tunisia and Morocco the first modern nationalists were to be found among the prosperous urban bourgeoisie, a bourgeoisie whose members tended, as Charles Gallagher has pointed out to be conservative, property conscious, family-oriented, and deeply religious, and so to present a type very different from the "middle class, venturesome entrepreneur active in the great movements of post-Reformation Europe" (Gallagher, 1963, p.87). About 1930,



members of a younger generation began to make their ideas felt. Under this new impulse nationalist sentiments spread first to the members of the petty bourgeoisie, then to the urban proletariat, and finally to the peasantry of the countryside, the tone of the nationalists becoming ever more vigorous, strident, and assured as the size of their following increased. This was a development common to many nationalist movements. But Moroccan and to a lesser extent Tunisia nationalism presented one unusual feature- the role in the nationalist movement played by the traditional ruler (Hallett, 1974).

The French needed a puppet as sultan of Morocco or bey of Tunis. In Morocco the sultan Yusuf who reigned from 1912 to 1927 suited their purpose admirably, and in choosing Yusuf's eighteen-year-old son, Sidi Muhammad, as his successor the French thought they had found a young man as peaceable and pliant as his father. But widening experience made of the new sultan a staunch nationalist and he emerged in the 1950's as a true leader of his country. In Tunisia a curious law of succession whereby the oldest member of the Husainid family was regarded as the natural successor to the office of bey provided the country with exceptionally elderly heads of state. But at least one of the beys, Moncef, proved himself a vigorous supporter of the nationalist cause. Both Moncef and Sidi Muhammed paid for their audacity with their thrones. Moncef was deposed in 1943 after a reign of less than a year and died in exile in 1947. Sidi Muhammad was more fortunate. Forcibly removed from his throne and country in 1953, he made a triumphal return in 1955.

As for the nationalist's leaders, once they had decided to appeal to the masses, they found themselves in the position of the sorcerer's apprentice who unleashes a force he is unable to control. Protests and mass demonstrations led to violent scenes, to repression, and to the arrest of the nationalist leaders. By 1939 with the nationalist parties banned, Allal al-Fasi exiled to Gabon and Baurguiba imprisoned in France, the colonial authorities could feel that they were fully in command at the situation.

The illusion of French omnipotence was shattered by their defeat in 1940 and by the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in 1942. Early in 1943 Sidi Muhammad of Morocco had a meeting with Frank D. Roosevelt. In the course of their conversation, the American president left the young sultan in no doubt of his own anti-colonialist sentiments. Roused by Roosevelt's words into conceiving a new future for his country, Sidi is said to have emerged from the interview a changed man. From henceforth he was to take an increasingly vigorous part in the nationalist struggle. As for the nationalist politicians, they too became aware of new opportunities. Early in 1944 the Istiql party was founded in Morocco; the party first manifesto contained a stirring and unequivocal demand for independence. In Tunisia, too, the last years of the war saw a revival of political activity, the return of Baurguiba and the establishment of new organisations well suited to support nationalist cause, including a vigorous body of trade unionist, the Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail.

While the French thought of the future of the protectorates in terms of co-sovereignty, hoping to devise a system that would allow the colons to retain a commanding position in local affairs, the nationalists were committed to outright independence. In these circumstances conflict was inevitable, but it was not until 1954 that really serious outbreaks of violence occurred. The disastrous deteriorations of the situation in the two protectorates occurred at a time when France was beset with other difficulties. French delegates were finding themselves increasingly isolated in the United Nations where Tunisia and Moroccan nationalists could count on many friends prepared to speak on their behalf. Eventually, following the initiative of Pierre Mendes, the French government, acting with a speed and boldness that nothing in its previous North Africa policy had led contemporaries to anticipate, concluded a series of agreements first with the Tunisian nationalists, then with the Moroccans. In March, 1956, the two protectorates recovered their position as independent states. Shortly afterwards the Spanish government terminated its protectorate over northern Morocco (Hallett, 1974).

DECOLONISATION OF THE BRITISH WEST-AFRICA

In comparison with many other parts of the Afro-Asian world, British West Africa was relatively little affected by the turmoil of World War Two. Nevertheless for the steadily increasing groups of politically conscious men in Lagos, Freetown, and Accra the war brought some stimulating and disturbing experiences. The extraordinary sight of Englishmen, servicemen in transit through West Africa, doing menial jobs, the ironic spectacle of British administrators denouncing racialism and imperialism- as practiced by their rivals, the Germans, the irksome sacrifices demanded by the war effort in the form of a shortage of consumer goods, and the stirring, hopeful affirmations of the Atlantic Charter. For the 1940s and 1950s thousand West African soldiers who saw service with the allied armies in Ethiopia and Burma there was an even wider range of novel sensations. Once demolished, these ex-servicemen showed that their contacts with other peoples had led them in the words of an official report, to develop "a political and national consciousness." Their familiarity with the hardship of life on their return home made for "a general communicable state of unrest" (report of the commission of enquiry into disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948, p. 682). West Africa intellectuals and ex-servicemen were not the only people to see the colonial situation in a new light.

No one in Britain could have predicted how swiftly the process of decolonisation would take place, "somewhere in West Africa within a century, within half a century- and what is that in the life of a people- a new African state will be born," wrote a group of Englishmen, notably sympathetic to African aspirations, in an official report on higher education in West Africa published in 1945 (minority report of the commission on higher education in west Africa



quoted in 1. Wallenstein, the road to independence: Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1964, p.42). Not more than twelve years later the Gold Coast had achieved independence, and by 1965, with the transformation of the miniscule colony of Gambia into a sovereign state, the process of decolonisation was complete.

In retrospect the British disengagement from West Africa appears to have taken place in a remarkably smooth and ordered manner and in an atmosphere of great cordiality. In fact the course of events in Nigeria and the Gold Coast clearly indicated, the process of decolonization was accompanied with many unexpected twists of fortune. Fortunately for the British, the features which complicated their withdrawal from the colonial territories- consideration of the strategic importance and the presence of British settlers- did not affect the West Africa. And the British enjoyed an inestimable advantage over other colonial powers in having at their disposal a great deal of practical experience relating to the process of decolonization.

There are many skeptics who argued that the institutions evolved over many centuries to suit a particular European society could not possibly be transferred effectively to other peoples of alien culture, who doubted whether Africans possessed the experience, or even the capacity, needed to manage the complicated machinery of a modern state, or who wondered how colonies made up of a wide variety of mutually hostile ethnic groups could ever be effectively transformed into modern nations. Decision-makers, both in Britain and in West Africa, could not afford to be mesmerized into inaction by such reflections.

By 1948, West African nationalism had developed in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria into a force that could be held in check by a massive show of counterforce- a line of action the British, with no vital interests at stake, were not prepared to consider. In these circumstances there was no alternative but to apply the formula of the 'Westminster model'.

In no West African territory was the transfer of power beset with as many difficulties as in Nigeria. This was hardly surprising. The country possessed a population- put at thirty-five million in the 1953 census- at once far larger and considerably more polities- heterogeneous than that of any other European colony in Africa. Over an extraordinarily varied conglomeration of older polities- the ancient kingdoms of Benin and Bornu, the Caliphate of Sokoto, the warring Yoruba states, Ibo village groups, and a multitude of smaller units- the British had erected the superstructure of colonial administration. In the past sixty years much had been done to modernize native systems of government at local levels. But the British had been exceedingly reluctant to allow Nigerians to participate in the work of government at the regional or national level. Relatively few local men barely exceeding hundred in 1945 had succeeded in entering the higher ranks of the civil service, and the country's legislative council drew its four elected members from Lagos and Calabar, leaving the other parts of the country to be represented only by European officials whose presence in the legislature ensured the government of a permanent majority.

By the late 1940s, the British authorities in Nigeria might well have found themselves faced with an extremely dangerous situation. A group of young militants, members of the Zikist movement, preached the need for positive action of a revolutionary kind. But the nationalist cause was already plagued by the "tribalism" that was destined to become the most characteristic feature of Nigerian politics. Given the vast cultural differences between North and South, political tensions could hardly have been avoided. But the situation was exacerbated by the fears felt by the Northerners that "unscrupulous" Southern politicians would use their greater familiarity with the techniques of modern politics to dominate their region, and by their resentment at the openly contemptuous attitude often displayed by Southerners to many aspects of Northern culture. No less understandable was the exasperation of many Southerners who were convinced that the process of Nigerian political development was being held back by ultra-conservative forces in the North.

The Nigerian situation as it developed during the 1950s cannot, however, be presented only in the simple terms of a conflict between North and South. Serious storms could be detected within each region. In the North, the aristocratic NPC was challenged, though with little success, by the radical Northern Elements Progressive Union. The NPC which secured the greatest success in the federal elections of 1959, winning 143 of the 312 seats, a result made possible by its control of the greater parts of Nigeria's most populous region. Nevertheless, had NCNC and the AG decided to form an alliance, the two parties between them would have secured a convincing majority in the federal parliament. But AG-NCNC relations had been embittered by years of struggle in the Western Region.

Accordingly, the NCNC decided to accept the NPC's offer to form a coalition, leaving the AG with its apparently secure base in the Western region to form the opposition in the federal parliament. A solution of sort had been achieved, allowing the British to make the final act in the transfer of power in October, 1960. Thus Africa's most populous state achieved its independence.

CONCLUSION

I will be concluding with the implications of the replacement syndrome earlier discussed and also some recommendations. While African thinkers accept Western assumptions, they must use them both against colonialists and neo-colonialists. For example, nationalism is a product of Western political thought, which recognizes the right of every nation to self-determination. So it quickly became the ideology of African independence movements as African thinkers exploited conceptual contradictions in colonial situations. While Europeans reaffirmed their belief in the right to self-determination during WW11, they denied this universal right to Africans. Nationalist ideology also influenced Pan-Africanism, which aimed not only at African unity, but also at the complete liberation of the continent from colonial



rule.

In the immediate postcolonial period, however, nationalism became an ideology of unity among emerging nation-states, aimed at nationalizing the disparate peoples that made up the new man-made state. This postcolonial use easily served the power claims of African leaders as they became nation builders. Therefore, any challenge to institutionalized opposition to national unity is seen as detrimental to the all-important task of bringing the nation together. Thus, nationalism becomes the subtle justification for a one-party system.

Furthermore, substitution syndrome suggests that African political thought makes little sense outside of a colonial setting. Consequently, most themes in African thought must be examined to make them relevant to the postcolonial period. As scala said

Contemporary African theorists pursued the goals of racial liberation, cultural development, and political independence until the end of the colonial era. The historical framework of colonial and anticolonial theorizing has now become an obstacle to exerting negative pressure on creative thought processes. It is largely irrelevant to the problems and problems of the postcolonial world and limits the scope of moral and scientific inquiry. For a conceptual breakthrough, it is necessary to get rid of the colonial/neocolonial stubbornness... (Sklar, 1985)

Furthermore, African political thought is characterized by a huge gap between theory and practice. The point is, since the theories are mostly put forward by individual politicians, the range of ideological contradictions and discontinuities is quite large, especially when these politicians moved from the colonial period to the post-colonial period, the reality is markedly different. Shortly after independence, African politicians found the imperatives of their new state—economic development, political stability, and national unity—difficult to satisfy with anticolonial theory.

Substitution Syndrome also leads to a denial of anything foreign, and therefore of Europeans. This denial is usually proportional to the pressing needs of the ruling class. First, people like Senghor, Nyerere, Amar, and Keita deny that class ever existed in Africa. It is said that the inherent class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in capitalist societies does not exist in Africa. The argument is that indigenous African societies are communal. It is to prevent this division that most African leaders have dismissed the trade union movement. Even a self-proclaimed scientific socialist like Nkrumah, who wrote a paper titled "Class Struggle in Africa" (Nkrumah, 1970), dulled unionism in Ghana.

Major ideas tend to die naturally with the demise of first-order thinkers. For example, the fires of pan-Africanism tend to be extinguished with the death of Nkrumah, a racial advocate for the political union of African nations. Originating in the last years of the 19th century, Pan-Africanism was a major theme in African thought from the 1900s to the early 1960s, and was influenced by Marcus Garvey, Edward Brydon, William Dubois and Kwame Endorsed by thinkers such as Nkrumah. But since the founding of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) in 1963, pan-Africanism has only survived as the organization symbolized African unity, although its initial weakness was defined by disparate and almost irreconcilable positions. Caused. Different African countries. Finally, as dozens of world leaders came together to mark the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, the French president echoed the thoughts of many European leaders, saying that "patriotism is the exact opposite of nationalism. Nationalism is the opposite of patriotism betrayal."

RECOMMENDATIONS

To begin with, the fire of unity should be rekindled just as it happened during the decolonization process. This time, there should be a shift from nationalism to regionalism and globalization. For instance Pan-Africanism which emphasizes continental unity and strong identification with ongoing anti-colonial struggles, was the leitmotif of Africa's developmental framework. This perspective sought to externalize Africa's problems, with much blame laid at the door of former colonial powers, with little responsibility and accountability demanded of the post-colonial African elite.

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